Deadly Quetta Blast Raises Alarming Questions
Quetta – A suicide bombing outside Shahwani Stadium on Tuesday night killed 15 people and injured 32. The explosion occurred shortly after a rally organized by the Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M) had ended. Hours later, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) claimed responsibility through a statement carried by AFP.
The BNP-M gathering was held to mark the death anniversary of veteran leader Sardar Attaullah Mengal. His son, Akhtar Mengal, leads the party today and has consistently championed Baloch rights through constitutional politics instead of insurgency. By striking after this rally, ISKP appeared to send a chilling signal: even non-violent political space in Balochistan is not safe.
Security experts say the attack was more than a terrorist act. They argue it fits into a disturbing pattern in which Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) allegedly manipulates extremist groups as instruments of political control.
Echoes of ISI’s Old Playbook
This is not the first time Pakistan’s security establishment has been accused of playing a “double game.” After the 9/11 attacks, Islamabad positioned itself as a U.S. ally in the war on terror. Yet, as journalist Ahmed Rashid detailed in Descent into Chaos, the ISI simultaneously sheltered Taliban commanders while supporting militant outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba.
American scholar C. Christine Fair has often described this policy as “fighting some terrorists while backing others.” Analysts believe the same formula is now applied in Balochistan, with ISKP given operational space to undercut nationalist movements.
A senior Islamabad-based security observer told Reuters: “It’s the same playbook as the tribal areas. Back then, TTP violence was tolerated to manage politics. Now ISKP is being nudged to keep the Baloch off balance.”
Calibrated Violence in Balochistan
The Quetta attack also displayed signs of calibrated violence. According to police sources, the bomber never reached the main BNP-M gathering, limiting the damage. While the loss of 15 lives was tragic, it could have been far worse.
A retired police officer told Al Jazeera: “If mass casualties were the goal, this would have been a bloodbath. It looks like intimidation, not annihilation.”
The Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) warned in its 2024 annual report that Islamabad often uses paramilitary forces and militant proxies to manage dissent in the provinces. The Quetta bombing, analysts say, fits that model—only this time ISKP has been deployed to instill fear in Baloch society.
Fallout Across the Region
Baloch armed groups have already threatened retaliation. A spokesperson for the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) told local reporters that the bombing proved “Islamabad uses Daesh against our people.” Security officials privately worry about an escalation of ambushes against troops in Quetta, Gwadar, and along CPEC routes.
The regional implications are also serious. For China, the attack deepens concerns about the safety of its citizens working on infrastructure projects. In March 2024, Reuters reported that five Chinese engineers were killed in Besham by a suicide bomber linked to ISKP. The Quetta incident, tied to politics, raises further doubts about Pakistan’s security assurances.
For Iran, the attack resonates with earlier ISKP operations. In January 2024, a deadly blast in Kerman killed dozens during a memorial for General Qassem Soleimani. The Quetta bombing highlights how ISKP militants operate across borders, threatening both Iran and Pakistan.
Islamabad’s Double Game Persists
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, speaking from Beijing, condemned the Quetta blast as a “cowardly” act and promised to eradicate terrorism. President Asif Ali Zardari expressed similar outrage, calling for justice.
Yet, many analysts remain unconvinced. As one columnist in Dawn noted: “You cannot claim to fight extremism while keeping extremists as your tools.” The suspicion is that Pakistan’s establishment selectively tolerates groups like ISKP when their violence helps to neutralize domestic political challenges, such as the Baloch nationalist cause.
A Strategy with Dangerous Consequences
The Shahwani Stadium bombing was not just another ISKP strike. It symbolized a larger strategy where Pakistan manipulates jihadist proxies to weaken internal dissent while projecting itself internationally as a victim of terrorism.
This dual approach has dangerous consequences. It risks escalating armed retaliation in Balochistan, undermines Pakistan’s credibility abroad, and fuels mistrust among its neighbors. For the Baloch political movement, the attack is a reminder of how even peaceful constitutional activism is targeted.
Whether Pakistan can continue this balancing act remains uncertain. What is clear is that the Quetta bombing has reinforced the perception of ISKP as more than an independent terror group—it is increasingly viewed as a pawn in Islamabad’s long-running power play.